紐約時報：中國是如何失去美國的 The New York Times: How China Lost America
發表於 : 週六 11月 05, 2022 6:52 pm
紐約時報：中國是如何失去美國的
The New York Times: How China Lost America
文／Thomas L. Friedman
2022 年 11 月 2 日
當未來的歷史學家回顧 2022 年的時候，關於這個問題，他們會有很多選擇：這一年發生的最重要的事情是什麼？是英國脫鉤、中國脫鉤、俄國脫鉤還是特朗普脫鉤？
是世界第六大經濟體英國的崩潰嗎，其部分原因在於英國在 2020 年不計後果地退出歐盟？是普京想把烏克蘭從地圖上抹去的瘋狂嘗試，讓俄羅斯與西方脫鉤（我稱之為 Ruxit），給全球能源和糧食市場造成了嚴重破壞嗎？是特朗普關於 2020 年大選被竊取的彌天大謊——特朗普脫鉤（Trumpit）——幾乎完全感染了共和黨，侵蝕了我們民主最寶貴的資產：我們和平、合法轉移權力的能力嗎？
抑或是中國在習近平主席領導下推動的中國脫鉤（Chexit）——結束四十年來中國經濟與西方的穩定融合，這個結束的標誌是我在北京的同事基思·布拉德捨（Keith Bradsher）普及起來的一個縮寫，用來描述今天西方跨國公司考慮把他們的下一個工廠放在哪裏。「ABC——除了中國，哪裏都行（Anywhere But China）。」
這是一個艱難的決定。把它們列在一起只能告訴你，2022 年的歷史已經成了一個多麼重要的轉折點。但我的這張票會投給中國脫鉤。
四十年來，美中經濟一體化極大地造福了美國消費者。它給一些美國人帶來了新的出口機會，也給另一些人帶來了失業，具體取決於他們所在的行業。它幫助數億中國人擺脫了極度貧困。它抑制了通貨膨脹，並努力防止任何大國戰爭的發生。
總的來說，我們會懷念那個已經逝去的時代，因為我們的世界將變得不那麼繁榮，不那麼一體化，地緣政治也不那麼穩定。
但它的確已經逝去。
正如《紐約客》中國問題專家歐逸文（Evan Osnos）在十月份指出的那樣：「2012 年，40% 的美國人對中國持負面看法；而如今，根據皮尤研究中心（Pew Research Center）的數據，這一比例超過了 80%。」
如果中國有一個民主政府，現在政府裏肯定會有人會要求知道，「我們是怎麼失去美國的？」
在美中關係的惡化中，美國並非無可指責。自第二次世界大戰以來，我們從來沒有遇到過在經濟和軍事上都與我們不相上下的地緣政治對手。來自北京的挑戰日漸加劇，對此我們從來都是不自在的，特別是因為中國的動力不是石油，而是它的儲蓄、辛勤努力和家庭作業——也就是說，願意付出犧牲，以此實現國家的偉大，並強調教育和科學。我們曾經就是這樣。
但中國的責任要大得多。要瞭解中國在這方面表現有多差，你可以先問北京這樣一個問題：「你在華盛頓擁有最大、最有勢力的遊說團體——而且不花你一分錢——可你為什麼搞砸了？」
我指的是美中貿易全國委員會和中美總商會。這些強大的商務組織代表著美國最大的跨國公司，他們在近四十年的時間裏積極遊說，希望與中國進行更多的貿易，以及加大在中國的投資和來自中國的投資，這是雙贏的。中國歐盟商會也是如此。
如今，這些遊說團體基本都沉默了。
怎麼會這樣？這是以下四個趨勢匯聚的結果。
第一個趨勢始於 2003 年，在中國加入世界貿易組織（多虧了美國）之後不久，當時中國市場改革的主要倡導者——朱鎔基總理下台了。朱鎔基希望美國公司進入中國，因為他相信中國公司必須在國內與最好的公司競爭，才能在世界範圍內有效競爭。
但他遭到中國許多內陸省份的反對，這些省份由國有企業主導，沒有興趣也沒有能力像沿海省份那樣參與全球競爭。而且它們的影響力越來越大。
當中國加入世貿組織並獲得進入西方市場的巨大免關稅或低關稅待遇時，它承諾會簽署一項有關政府採購的世貿組織附屬協議，該協議將限制中國在進行巨額政府採購時歧視外國供應商的能力。但中國從未簽署該協議。相反，中國繼續將其巨大的國家購買力導向國有工業，並繼續補貼它們。
太多的中國產業只是複製或竊取在中國建廠的西方公司的知識產權。然後中國的產業利用他們受保護的國內市場擴大規模，然後在國內外與同樣的西方公司競爭，並得到北京的補貼。
正如我在 2018 年的一篇專欄文章中所解釋的那樣：即使美國向世貿組織提出抗議——比如中國不公平地將美國信用卡公司拒之門外，然後在世貿組織的仲裁案件中敗訴——中國仍然只是在慢吞吞地履行 17 年前許下的開放承諾。那是銀聯等中國公司已經在中國的信用卡市場佔據主導地位，而 Visa 等美國公司只剩下殘羹剩飯。有誰想過為什麼如今歐盟對中國的出口僅略高於對瑞士的出口？
正因如此，許多美國和歐洲的公司一開始對中國的市場操縱睜隻眼閉只眼，因為他們仍然在那裏賺錢；後來又向他們的政府抱怨——但要求他們不要向北京抱怨，因為擔心報復；到今天，他們尋求將供應鏈擴展到中國以外的任何地方。就連蘋果現在也在實現生產多元化，更多地依賴越南和印度。
「美國商界喜歡中國，雖然關係總是緊張，但曾經有一種找到機遇和夥伴關係的感覺。對中國來說，要讓商界對中國產生反感，可是需要付出很大努力的，但中國做到了，」在中國生活了三十年的商業顧問麥健陸（Jim McGregor）告訴我，他就這個主題寫了三本書。
怪不得在特朗普與北京開始貿易戰後，一位長期在中國工作的美國企業高管對我說，特朗普不是美國值得擁有的美國總統，但他是中國值得擁有的美國總統。我們這邊總得有個人來做這件事。
現在習近平主席這邊也做了同樣的事情。正如中國歐盟商會主席約爾格·伍特克（Joerg Wuttke）在接受採訪時所說，習近平得到前所未有的第三個任期，靠的是強調馬克思主義和意識形態而不是市場和實用主義的綱領，「對我來說這表明，中國經濟的開放將不會持續下去。……我們不得不假設中國正在將自己與其他國家區分開來，並將建立一個與西方自由的、以市場為導向的模式相對立的模式。」
第二個趨勢可以追溯到 1989 年天安門事件之後，當時中共領導層試圖用超民族主義的高壓水槍來壓制中國青年的民主願望。我在北京的同事王月眉（Vivian Wang）最近採訪了長期以來被視為中國民族主義旗手的政治作家王小東，他曾說過「中國前進的步伐不可阻擋」。然而，王小東告訴《紐約時報》，在習近平領導下，中國民族主義運動在社交媒體上其他有影響力的人推動下走得太遠了：「我被稱為是中國民族主義的旗手，民族主義的教父，我是他們的祖師爺，是我造就他們。但是我真的從來沒有教過他們這個樣子。」
2018 年在中國與企業和政府人士交談時，我體會到了這一點。當我提出中國的不公平貿易行為時，回擊的聲音是這樣的：「你沒意識到，你們美國人來不及了？我們大到不能再被呼來喚去。你應該十年前就意識到這一點。」我回答說，這種傲慢是會讓國家遇到麻煩的。
這導致了第三個趨勢：中國採取更加激進的外交政策，試圖在整個南海確立主導地位，嚇壞了中國的主要鄰國日本、韓國、越南、印度和台灣。
但最後一個趨勢可能是最令人不舒服的：中國沒有進口有效的西方製造的疫苗來遏制大流行，而是依賴於「清零」政策，將整個城市封鎖，並利用監控國家擁有的所有新工具：無人機、面部識別、無處不在的閉路監視鏡頭、手機跟蹤甚至跟蹤餐廳的食客——他們必須出示二維碼，被掃瞄和記錄。
這像是習近平在防止新冠暴發的同時防止自由暴發的戰略。
習近平未能掌握的是二十一世紀所有最先進的技術——如半導體和 mRNA 疫苗——都需要龐大而複雜的全球供應鏈，因為沒有一個國家可以在每一個日益複雜的組件上都做到最好。但這樣的供應鏈需要合作夥伴之間的大量合作和信任，而這正是習近平在過去十年中揮霍殆盡的東西。
習近平相信中國可以在任何事情上都做到最好，那就像是相信中國籃球隊總能擊敗世界全明星籃球隊。
我很懷疑。
但我也擔心。我承認，我不喜歡用「中國」這個詞。我更願意說「全世界人口六分之一的說漢語的人」。這樣才能看到這個問題的實際規模。我想看到中國人蓬勃發展；這對世界有益。但他們今天走錯了路。當六分之一的人類在我們仍然緊密相連的世界中犯錯時——例如，中國仍然持有近一萬億美元的美國國債——每個人都會感到他們的痛苦。
https://cn.nytimes.com/opinion/20221102 ... e-economy/
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The New York Times: How China Lost America
By Thomas L. Friedman
1 November, 2022
When future historians look back on 2022, they will have a lot to choose from when they ask the question: What was the most important thing that happened that year? Was it Brexit, Chexit, Ruxit or Trumpit?
Was it the meltdown of the world's sixth-largest economy, Britain, fueled in part by its reckless 2020 exit from the European Union? Was it the demented attempt by Vladimir Putin to wipe Ukraine off the map, which has decoupled Russia from the West — what I call Ruxit — creating havoc with worldwide energy and food markets? Was it the near-total infection of the G.O.P. with Donald Trump's Big Lie that the 2020 election was stolen — Trumpit — which is eroding our democracy's most cherished asset: our ability to peacefully and legitimately transfer power?
Or was it China's drive under President Xi Jinping for Chexit — an end to four decades of steady integration of China's economy with the West, an end symbolized by the abbreviation popularized by my colleague in Beijing Keith Bradsher to describe where Western multinationals today think about putting their next factory: “A.B.C. — Anywhere But China.”
It's a tough call. And just listing them all together only tells you what a hinge of history 2022 has become. But my vote goes to Chexit.
We've had four decades of U.S.-China economic integration that hugely benefited American consumers. It led to new export opportunities for some Americans and unemployment for others, depending on the industry they were in. It helped raise hundreds of millions of Chinese out of extreme poverty. It tamped down inflation and worked to prevent any great power wars.
On the whole, we will miss that era now that it's gone, because our world will be less prosperous, less integrated and less geopolitically stable.
But gone it is.
As The New Yorker's China expert, Evan Osnos, pointed out in October: “In 2012, 40 percent of Americans had an unfavorable view of China; today, more than 80 percent do, according to the Pew Research Center.”
If China had a democratic government, someone there right now would surely be demanding to know, “How did we lose America?”
America is not blameless in the erosion of this relationship. Since World War II, we had never had a geopolitical rival that was our near-peer both economically and militarily. We've never been comfortable with Beijing's rising challenge, especially because China was not propelled by oil but by its savings, hard work and homework — i.e., a willingness to sacrifice to achieve national greatness, with a strong emphasis on education and science. That used to be us.
But much more of this is on China. To appreciate how badly China has lost America, you could start with this question to Beijing: “How is it that you had the biggest, most powerful lobby in Washington — and it didn't cost you a penny — and yet you blew it?”
I'm referring to the U.S.-China Business Council and the United States of America-China Chamber of Commerce. These powerful business groups, representing America's biggest multinationals, energetically lobbied for nearly four decades that more trade with China, and investment in and from China, was a win-win. So did the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China.
Today, these lobbies have gone mostly quiet.
What happened? It was the culmination of four trends.
The first started in 2003, shortly after China was admitted into the World Trade Organization (thanks to America), when the leading advocate for market reforms in China — Prime Minister Zhu Rongji — stepped down. Zhu wanted U.S. companies to be in China because he believed that Chinese companies had to compete with the best at home to compete effectively in the world.
But Zhu was opposed by China's many inland provinces, which were dominated by state-owned Chinese industries that had no interest or ability to compete globally the way China's coastal provinces could. And they became increasingly influential.
When China joined the W.T.O. and won immense tariff-free or reduced-tariff access to Western markets, it promised to sign on to a W.T.O. side agreement on government procurements that would have limited China's ability to discriminate against foreign suppliers when making huge government purchases. But China never signed it.
Instead, it kept steering its tremendous state buying power to its state-owned industries — and continued subsidizing them as well.
Way too many Chinese industries just copied or stole intellectual property from Western companies that had built factories in China. The Chinese industries then used their protected domestic market to gain scale — and then they competed against those very same Western companies at home and abroad — AND got subsidized by Beijing.
As I explained in a 2018 column: Even when the U.S. protested to the W.T.O. — as happened when China unfairly kept U.S. credit-card companies out, then lost the arbitration case at the W.T.O. — China still slow-walked making good on a 17-year-old promise to open up to them. By then, Chinese companies, like UnionPay, so dominated China's credit-card market that U.S. companies, like Visa, were left with crumbs. Any wonder that E.U. exports to China today are only slightly larger than those to Switzerland?
Which is why many U.S. and European companies went from looking the other way at China's market manipulations, because they were still making money there, to complaining to their governments — but asking them not to complain to Beijing for fear of retaliation — to looking today to expand their supply chains to anywhere but China. Even Apple is now diversifying production to rely more on Vietnam and India.
“The U.S. business community loved China — there were always tensions, but there used to be a sense of opportunity and partnership. For China to turn the business community sour on China took hard work, but China did it,” Jim McGregor, who lived in China for 30 years as a business consultant and wrote three books based on his experience there, told me.
No wonder a U.S. business executive who had long worked in China remarked to me after Trump started his trade war with Beijing that Trump was not the American president America deserved, but he was the American president China deserved. Someone had to call the game from our side.
Now President Xi has done the same from his side. As Joerg Wuttke, president of the E.U. Chamber of Commerce in China, put it in an interview, Xi's election to an unprecedented third term on a platform emphasizing Marxism and ideology over markets and pragmatism “shows me that the opening up of the Chinese economy is not going to continue. … We have to assume that China is setting itself apart from other countries and will build a countermodel to the liberal, market-oriented model of the West.”
The second trend dates back to the aftermath of Tiananmen Square in 1989, when the Chinese Communist Party leadership sought to dampen the democratic aspirations of China's youth with a fire hose of hyper-nationalism. My colleague in Beijing Vivian Wang recently interviewed the political writer Wang Xiaodong, long considered the standard-bearer of Chinese nationalism, who once said that “China's forward march is unstoppable.” However, Wang Xiaodong told The Times that under Xi, the Chinese nationalism movement, spurred on by other influencers on social media, had gone too far: “I've been called nationalism's godfather. I created them. But I never told them to be this crazy.”
I got a taste of this in 2018 when I was in China talking with business and government figures. When I raised China's unfair trade practices, the pushback sounded like this: “You realize that you Americans are too late? We're too big to be pushed around anymore. You should have done this a decade ago.” I responded that that kind of hubris gets countries in trouble.
Which leads to a third trend: a much more aggressive Chinese foreign policy that is trying to assert dominance across the whole South China Sea, frightening China's key neighbors, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, India and Taiwan.
But the last trend may be the most off-putting: Instead of importing effective Western-made vaccines to keep the pandemic at bay, China is relying on a “zero Covid” policy that uses lockdowns of whole cities as well as all the new tools of a surveillance state: drones, facial recognition, ubiquitous closed-circuit television cameras, cellphone tracking and even tracking of restaurant patrons, who must present a QR code to be scanned and recorded.
It feels like a Xi strategy for preventing both Covid and freedom from breaking out.
What Xi fails to grasp is that all of the most advanced technologies of the 21st century — like semiconductors and mRNA vaccines — require big, complex global supply chains, because no country can be the best at each one of their increasingly sophisticated components. But such supply chains require a huge amount of collaboration and trust among partners, and that is exactly what Xi has squandered in the last decade.
Xi's belief that China can be the best at everything alone is like believing that China's basketball team can always defeat the world's all-star basketball team.
Color me dubious.
But also color me worried. I confess, I don't like to use the term “China.” I much prefer “one-sixth of humanity who speak Chinese.” It captures the true scale of what we are dealing with. I want to see the Chinese people thrive; it's good for the world. But they're going down the wrong track today. And when one-sixth of humanity makes a wrong turn in our still very connected world — China, for instance, still holds almost $1 trillion of U.S. Treasury debt — everyone will feel their pain.
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/01/opin ... onomy.html
The New York Times: How China Lost America
文／Thomas L. Friedman
2022 年 11 月 2 日
當未來的歷史學家回顧 2022 年的時候，關於這個問題，他們會有很多選擇：這一年發生的最重要的事情是什麼？是英國脫鉤、中國脫鉤、俄國脫鉤還是特朗普脫鉤？
是世界第六大經濟體英國的崩潰嗎，其部分原因在於英國在 2020 年不計後果地退出歐盟？是普京想把烏克蘭從地圖上抹去的瘋狂嘗試，讓俄羅斯與西方脫鉤（我稱之為 Ruxit），給全球能源和糧食市場造成了嚴重破壞嗎？是特朗普關於 2020 年大選被竊取的彌天大謊——特朗普脫鉤（Trumpit）——幾乎完全感染了共和黨，侵蝕了我們民主最寶貴的資產：我們和平、合法轉移權力的能力嗎？
抑或是中國在習近平主席領導下推動的中國脫鉤（Chexit）——結束四十年來中國經濟與西方的穩定融合，這個結束的標誌是我在北京的同事基思·布拉德捨（Keith Bradsher）普及起來的一個縮寫，用來描述今天西方跨國公司考慮把他們的下一個工廠放在哪裏。「ABC——除了中國，哪裏都行（Anywhere But China）。」
這是一個艱難的決定。把它們列在一起只能告訴你，2022 年的歷史已經成了一個多麼重要的轉折點。但我的這張票會投給中國脫鉤。
四十年來，美中經濟一體化極大地造福了美國消費者。它給一些美國人帶來了新的出口機會，也給另一些人帶來了失業，具體取決於他們所在的行業。它幫助數億中國人擺脫了極度貧困。它抑制了通貨膨脹，並努力防止任何大國戰爭的發生。
總的來說，我們會懷念那個已經逝去的時代，因為我們的世界將變得不那麼繁榮，不那麼一體化，地緣政治也不那麼穩定。
但它的確已經逝去。
正如《紐約客》中國問題專家歐逸文（Evan Osnos）在十月份指出的那樣：「2012 年，40% 的美國人對中國持負面看法；而如今，根據皮尤研究中心（Pew Research Center）的數據，這一比例超過了 80%。」
如果中國有一個民主政府，現在政府裏肯定會有人會要求知道，「我們是怎麼失去美國的？」
在美中關係的惡化中，美國並非無可指責。自第二次世界大戰以來，我們從來沒有遇到過在經濟和軍事上都與我們不相上下的地緣政治對手。來自北京的挑戰日漸加劇，對此我們從來都是不自在的，特別是因為中國的動力不是石油，而是它的儲蓄、辛勤努力和家庭作業——也就是說，願意付出犧牲，以此實現國家的偉大，並強調教育和科學。我們曾經就是這樣。
但中國的責任要大得多。要瞭解中國在這方面表現有多差，你可以先問北京這樣一個問題：「你在華盛頓擁有最大、最有勢力的遊說團體——而且不花你一分錢——可你為什麼搞砸了？」
我指的是美中貿易全國委員會和中美總商會。這些強大的商務組織代表著美國最大的跨國公司，他們在近四十年的時間裏積極遊說，希望與中國進行更多的貿易，以及加大在中國的投資和來自中國的投資，這是雙贏的。中國歐盟商會也是如此。
如今，這些遊說團體基本都沉默了。
怎麼會這樣？這是以下四個趨勢匯聚的結果。
第一個趨勢始於 2003 年，在中國加入世界貿易組織（多虧了美國）之後不久，當時中國市場改革的主要倡導者——朱鎔基總理下台了。朱鎔基希望美國公司進入中國，因為他相信中國公司必須在國內與最好的公司競爭，才能在世界範圍內有效競爭。
但他遭到中國許多內陸省份的反對，這些省份由國有企業主導，沒有興趣也沒有能力像沿海省份那樣參與全球競爭。而且它們的影響力越來越大。
當中國加入世貿組織並獲得進入西方市場的巨大免關稅或低關稅待遇時，它承諾會簽署一項有關政府採購的世貿組織附屬協議，該協議將限制中國在進行巨額政府採購時歧視外國供應商的能力。但中國從未簽署該協議。相反，中國繼續將其巨大的國家購買力導向國有工業，並繼續補貼它們。
太多的中國產業只是複製或竊取在中國建廠的西方公司的知識產權。然後中國的產業利用他們受保護的國內市場擴大規模，然後在國內外與同樣的西方公司競爭，並得到北京的補貼。
正如我在 2018 年的一篇專欄文章中所解釋的那樣：即使美國向世貿組織提出抗議——比如中國不公平地將美國信用卡公司拒之門外，然後在世貿組織的仲裁案件中敗訴——中國仍然只是在慢吞吞地履行 17 年前許下的開放承諾。那是銀聯等中國公司已經在中國的信用卡市場佔據主導地位，而 Visa 等美國公司只剩下殘羹剩飯。有誰想過為什麼如今歐盟對中國的出口僅略高於對瑞士的出口？
正因如此，許多美國和歐洲的公司一開始對中國的市場操縱睜隻眼閉只眼，因為他們仍然在那裏賺錢；後來又向他們的政府抱怨——但要求他們不要向北京抱怨，因為擔心報復；到今天，他們尋求將供應鏈擴展到中國以外的任何地方。就連蘋果現在也在實現生產多元化，更多地依賴越南和印度。
「美國商界喜歡中國，雖然關係總是緊張，但曾經有一種找到機遇和夥伴關係的感覺。對中國來說，要讓商界對中國產生反感，可是需要付出很大努力的，但中國做到了，」在中國生活了三十年的商業顧問麥健陸（Jim McGregor）告訴我，他就這個主題寫了三本書。
怪不得在特朗普與北京開始貿易戰後，一位長期在中國工作的美國企業高管對我說，特朗普不是美國值得擁有的美國總統，但他是中國值得擁有的美國總統。我們這邊總得有個人來做這件事。
現在習近平主席這邊也做了同樣的事情。正如中國歐盟商會主席約爾格·伍特克（Joerg Wuttke）在接受採訪時所說，習近平得到前所未有的第三個任期，靠的是強調馬克思主義和意識形態而不是市場和實用主義的綱領，「對我來說這表明，中國經濟的開放將不會持續下去。……我們不得不假設中國正在將自己與其他國家區分開來，並將建立一個與西方自由的、以市場為導向的模式相對立的模式。」
第二個趨勢可以追溯到 1989 年天安門事件之後，當時中共領導層試圖用超民族主義的高壓水槍來壓制中國青年的民主願望。我在北京的同事王月眉（Vivian Wang）最近採訪了長期以來被視為中國民族主義旗手的政治作家王小東，他曾說過「中國前進的步伐不可阻擋」。然而，王小東告訴《紐約時報》，在習近平領導下，中國民族主義運動在社交媒體上其他有影響力的人推動下走得太遠了：「我被稱為是中國民族主義的旗手，民族主義的教父，我是他們的祖師爺，是我造就他們。但是我真的從來沒有教過他們這個樣子。」
2018 年在中國與企業和政府人士交談時，我體會到了這一點。當我提出中國的不公平貿易行為時，回擊的聲音是這樣的：「你沒意識到，你們美國人來不及了？我們大到不能再被呼來喚去。你應該十年前就意識到這一點。」我回答說，這種傲慢是會讓國家遇到麻煩的。
這導致了第三個趨勢：中國採取更加激進的外交政策，試圖在整個南海確立主導地位，嚇壞了中國的主要鄰國日本、韓國、越南、印度和台灣。
但最後一個趨勢可能是最令人不舒服的：中國沒有進口有效的西方製造的疫苗來遏制大流行，而是依賴於「清零」政策，將整個城市封鎖，並利用監控國家擁有的所有新工具：無人機、面部識別、無處不在的閉路監視鏡頭、手機跟蹤甚至跟蹤餐廳的食客——他們必須出示二維碼，被掃瞄和記錄。
這像是習近平在防止新冠暴發的同時防止自由暴發的戰略。
習近平未能掌握的是二十一世紀所有最先進的技術——如半導體和 mRNA 疫苗——都需要龐大而複雜的全球供應鏈，因為沒有一個國家可以在每一個日益複雜的組件上都做到最好。但這樣的供應鏈需要合作夥伴之間的大量合作和信任，而這正是習近平在過去十年中揮霍殆盡的東西。
習近平相信中國可以在任何事情上都做到最好，那就像是相信中國籃球隊總能擊敗世界全明星籃球隊。
我很懷疑。
但我也擔心。我承認，我不喜歡用「中國」這個詞。我更願意說「全世界人口六分之一的說漢語的人」。這樣才能看到這個問題的實際規模。我想看到中國人蓬勃發展；這對世界有益。但他們今天走錯了路。當六分之一的人類在我們仍然緊密相連的世界中犯錯時——例如，中國仍然持有近一萬億美元的美國國債——每個人都會感到他們的痛苦。
https://cn.nytimes.com/opinion/20221102 ... e-economy/
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The New York Times: How China Lost America
By Thomas L. Friedman
1 November, 2022
When future historians look back on 2022, they will have a lot to choose from when they ask the question: What was the most important thing that happened that year? Was it Brexit, Chexit, Ruxit or Trumpit?
Was it the meltdown of the world's sixth-largest economy, Britain, fueled in part by its reckless 2020 exit from the European Union? Was it the demented attempt by Vladimir Putin to wipe Ukraine off the map, which has decoupled Russia from the West — what I call Ruxit — creating havoc with worldwide energy and food markets? Was it the near-total infection of the G.O.P. with Donald Trump's Big Lie that the 2020 election was stolen — Trumpit — which is eroding our democracy's most cherished asset: our ability to peacefully and legitimately transfer power?
Or was it China's drive under President Xi Jinping for Chexit — an end to four decades of steady integration of China's economy with the West, an end symbolized by the abbreviation popularized by my colleague in Beijing Keith Bradsher to describe where Western multinationals today think about putting their next factory: “A.B.C. — Anywhere But China.”
It's a tough call. And just listing them all together only tells you what a hinge of history 2022 has become. But my vote goes to Chexit.
We've had four decades of U.S.-China economic integration that hugely benefited American consumers. It led to new export opportunities for some Americans and unemployment for others, depending on the industry they were in. It helped raise hundreds of millions of Chinese out of extreme poverty. It tamped down inflation and worked to prevent any great power wars.
On the whole, we will miss that era now that it's gone, because our world will be less prosperous, less integrated and less geopolitically stable.
But gone it is.
As The New Yorker's China expert, Evan Osnos, pointed out in October: “In 2012, 40 percent of Americans had an unfavorable view of China; today, more than 80 percent do, according to the Pew Research Center.”
If China had a democratic government, someone there right now would surely be demanding to know, “How did we lose America?”
America is not blameless in the erosion of this relationship. Since World War II, we had never had a geopolitical rival that was our near-peer both economically and militarily. We've never been comfortable with Beijing's rising challenge, especially because China was not propelled by oil but by its savings, hard work and homework — i.e., a willingness to sacrifice to achieve national greatness, with a strong emphasis on education and science. That used to be us.
But much more of this is on China. To appreciate how badly China has lost America, you could start with this question to Beijing: “How is it that you had the biggest, most powerful lobby in Washington — and it didn't cost you a penny — and yet you blew it?”
I'm referring to the U.S.-China Business Council and the United States of America-China Chamber of Commerce. These powerful business groups, representing America's biggest multinationals, energetically lobbied for nearly four decades that more trade with China, and investment in and from China, was a win-win. So did the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China.
Today, these lobbies have gone mostly quiet.
What happened? It was the culmination of four trends.
The first started in 2003, shortly after China was admitted into the World Trade Organization (thanks to America), when the leading advocate for market reforms in China — Prime Minister Zhu Rongji — stepped down. Zhu wanted U.S. companies to be in China because he believed that Chinese companies had to compete with the best at home to compete effectively in the world.
But Zhu was opposed by China's many inland provinces, which were dominated by state-owned Chinese industries that had no interest or ability to compete globally the way China's coastal provinces could. And they became increasingly influential.
When China joined the W.T.O. and won immense tariff-free or reduced-tariff access to Western markets, it promised to sign on to a W.T.O. side agreement on government procurements that would have limited China's ability to discriminate against foreign suppliers when making huge government purchases. But China never signed it.
Instead, it kept steering its tremendous state buying power to its state-owned industries — and continued subsidizing them as well.
Way too many Chinese industries just copied or stole intellectual property from Western companies that had built factories in China. The Chinese industries then used their protected domestic market to gain scale — and then they competed against those very same Western companies at home and abroad — AND got subsidized by Beijing.
As I explained in a 2018 column: Even when the U.S. protested to the W.T.O. — as happened when China unfairly kept U.S. credit-card companies out, then lost the arbitration case at the W.T.O. — China still slow-walked making good on a 17-year-old promise to open up to them. By then, Chinese companies, like UnionPay, so dominated China's credit-card market that U.S. companies, like Visa, were left with crumbs. Any wonder that E.U. exports to China today are only slightly larger than those to Switzerland?
Which is why many U.S. and European companies went from looking the other way at China's market manipulations, because they were still making money there, to complaining to their governments — but asking them not to complain to Beijing for fear of retaliation — to looking today to expand their supply chains to anywhere but China. Even Apple is now diversifying production to rely more on Vietnam and India.
“The U.S. business community loved China — there were always tensions, but there used to be a sense of opportunity and partnership. For China to turn the business community sour on China took hard work, but China did it,” Jim McGregor, who lived in China for 30 years as a business consultant and wrote three books based on his experience there, told me.
No wonder a U.S. business executive who had long worked in China remarked to me after Trump started his trade war with Beijing that Trump was not the American president America deserved, but he was the American president China deserved. Someone had to call the game from our side.
Now President Xi has done the same from his side. As Joerg Wuttke, president of the E.U. Chamber of Commerce in China, put it in an interview, Xi's election to an unprecedented third term on a platform emphasizing Marxism and ideology over markets and pragmatism “shows me that the opening up of the Chinese economy is not going to continue. … We have to assume that China is setting itself apart from other countries and will build a countermodel to the liberal, market-oriented model of the West.”
The second trend dates back to the aftermath of Tiananmen Square in 1989, when the Chinese Communist Party leadership sought to dampen the democratic aspirations of China's youth with a fire hose of hyper-nationalism. My colleague in Beijing Vivian Wang recently interviewed the political writer Wang Xiaodong, long considered the standard-bearer of Chinese nationalism, who once said that “China's forward march is unstoppable.” However, Wang Xiaodong told The Times that under Xi, the Chinese nationalism movement, spurred on by other influencers on social media, had gone too far: “I've been called nationalism's godfather. I created them. But I never told them to be this crazy.”
I got a taste of this in 2018 when I was in China talking with business and government figures. When I raised China's unfair trade practices, the pushback sounded like this: “You realize that you Americans are too late? We're too big to be pushed around anymore. You should have done this a decade ago.” I responded that that kind of hubris gets countries in trouble.
Which leads to a third trend: a much more aggressive Chinese foreign policy that is trying to assert dominance across the whole South China Sea, frightening China's key neighbors, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, India and Taiwan.
But the last trend may be the most off-putting: Instead of importing effective Western-made vaccines to keep the pandemic at bay, China is relying on a “zero Covid” policy that uses lockdowns of whole cities as well as all the new tools of a surveillance state: drones, facial recognition, ubiquitous closed-circuit television cameras, cellphone tracking and even tracking of restaurant patrons, who must present a QR code to be scanned and recorded.
It feels like a Xi strategy for preventing both Covid and freedom from breaking out.
What Xi fails to grasp is that all of the most advanced technologies of the 21st century — like semiconductors and mRNA vaccines — require big, complex global supply chains, because no country can be the best at each one of their increasingly sophisticated components. But such supply chains require a huge amount of collaboration and trust among partners, and that is exactly what Xi has squandered in the last decade.
Xi's belief that China can be the best at everything alone is like believing that China's basketball team can always defeat the world's all-star basketball team.
Color me dubious.
But also color me worried. I confess, I don't like to use the term “China.” I much prefer “one-sixth of humanity who speak Chinese.” It captures the true scale of what we are dealing with. I want to see the Chinese people thrive; it's good for the world. But they're going down the wrong track today. And when one-sixth of humanity makes a wrong turn in our still very connected world — China, for instance, still holds almost $1 trillion of U.S. Treasury debt — everyone will feel their pain.
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/01/opin ... onomy.html